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My general concern in this paper is to investigate the extent to which certain 
ideas in the philosophy of science may be put to illuminating work in 
aesthetics. In its most valuable instances art, like science, is a cognitive 
enterprise. Scientists and artists employ various modes of representation to 
reveal things about their objects. In light of this, I want to ask: might we learn 
something about artistic practice by examining how scientists are alleged to 
deal with their objects? I will attempt to show that we can. My claim – in 
specific terms – is that the anti-realist’s view of scientific activity possesses 
the conceptual resources from which we can sketch a plausible theory of a 
certain form of valuable artistic activity – which I label aesthetic cognition.  
 
[ I ] 
 
In the first part of the paper, I want to provide an account of scientific anti-
realism as exemplified by Nancy Cartwright’s views from her book How the 
Laws of Physics Lie.1 Before we start, I would like to say something about my 
attitude to Cartwright. Firstly, I am interested in Cartwright only as an 
exemplar of anti-realism, and so not in the intricacies of her argument. Much 
                                            
1 Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983). The account is 
derived from the ‘Introduction’, pp. 1 – 20. 
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is ignored. And since my knowledge of theoretical physics is at best limited, I 
take on trust a lot of what she has to say. I am not in a position to evaluate her 
claims with respect to scientific practice. Secondly, my account of anti-realism 
is designed to extract a highly suggestive conceptual structure for use 
elsewhere. It is not intended as yet another contribution to the eternal realist – 
anti-realist debate.  
 Cartwright starts with the question of the nature of explanation in 
physics. Explanation comes in two forms. Firstly, one can give a causal 
explanation of a phenomenon. In such explanations use is made of specific 
phenomenological laws that tell us precisely what occurs in concrete 
situations. Reference will be made, for example, to particular substances, 
entities, processes, velocities, temperature conditions, and so forth. Secondly, 
an explanation may be offered in relation to abstract theoretical laws which 
may take the form of fundamental mathematical equations. Here the 
phenomenon is fitted into a wider theoretical context, and by virtue of the 
generality of the laws employed, brought into relation with other phenomena. 
The classical example here is Newton’s laws of motion. Cartwright cites 
Boltzmann’s equation and the general equation of continuity as mathematical 
examples. 
 Both the realist and anti-realist will endorse the preceding account of 
the distinction between phenomenological and theoretical laws. And they will 
also agree upon how best to understand the explanatory power or success of 
phenomenological laws. Phenomenological laws are descriptive, they are 
literal representations of reality – they are true of the objects in reality. Thus 
 3 
their success in providing explanations of phenomena is due to the fact that 
they accurately describe the causal processes that govern them.  
The realist and anti-realist can agree on the phenomenological, then, 
but the same is not true when it comes to the theoretical. More specifically, 
realism and anti-realism diverge on the question of how best to understand 
the explanatory power of theoretical laws. How are we to account for the 
success of the fundamental equations of physics? The realist’s answer is 
contained in the covering-law model of explanation, while Cartwright’s anti-
realist answer is provided in what she calls the simulacrum account of 
explanation. I will discuss each of these in turn. 
  We have already learnt that a phenomenon can be explained by fitting 
it into a general theoretical framework that brings the phenomenon into 
relation with fundamental theoretical laws. The covering-law model provides 
an account of this activity. It states: if we can show how the various 
phenomenological laws that are true of a phenomenon derive from a theory’s 
fundamental laws, then we have succeeded in fitting the phenomenon into a 
general theory. The crucial presupposition of the covering-law model, then, is 
that phenomenological laws are derivations of theoretical laws. Or to put the 
point differently, theoretical laws cover phenomenological laws. It is this 
presupposition that leads us to the realist commitments of the covering-law 
model. 
 According to Cartwright, for the proponents of the covering-law model, 
theoretical laws cover not only phenomenological laws, but also the 
phenomenon itself. Theoretical laws, that is, apply directly to the 
phenomenon. This view involves two claims. The first concerns the nature of 
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the distinction between phenomenological and theoretical laws. According to 
the covering-law model, phenomenological laws and theoretical laws are 
distinct not in kind, but degree. They both apply directly to the phenomenon 
and explain it in relation to the processes that govern it. The only difference 
between the two is that phenomenological laws are specific and concrete, 
while theoretical laws are general and abstract. The second claim concerns 
the nature of the explanatory power of theoretical laws. On the covering-law 
view, theoretical laws provide successful explanations for precisely the same 
reason that phenomenological laws do. Theoretical laws are true of reality, 
they accurately describe the processes that govern phenomena. 
 Cartwright states that the covering-law model of theoretical explanation 
is a bad model. It is bad principally because it misconstrues the way that 
theoretical explanation actually works in scientific practice. Cartwright 
observes that it is usual in physics to give alternative theoretical treatments of 
the same phenomenon. In different treatments, distinct laws and equations 
are employed that bring out some aspects of the phenomenon at the expense 
of others. Different treatments serve different theoretical functions. 
The crucial point is that there will be a number of distinct theoretical 
treatments that will provide successful explanations of the same thing. This 
means that theoretical explanatory success cannot be due to descriptive 
accuracy. If it were based on descriptive accuracy, then there would be only 
one theory that successfully explains a phenomenon. As Cartwright assures 
us, this is simply not the case. 
Things look different with the explanatory power of phenomenological 
laws. Here explanatory success means getting the causal story right, and 
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there is only one right causal story. A causal account is held to be 
descriptively accurate and true until a better one comes along to displace it. 
For the anti-realist, then, theoretical explanatory power is distinct in 
kind from phenomenological explanatory power. The realist proponents of the 
covering-law model have falsely lumped the theoretical together with the 
phenomenological. The success of theoretical laws has nothing to do with 
descriptive accuracy as conceived by the realist. What it does have to do with 
Cartwright expounds in her simulacrum account of explanation. 
 
[ I I ] 
 
Cartwright’s view is that the theoretical – unlike the phenomenological – is not 
tied directly to reality. Rather, the theoretical is tied to reality by way of a 
model. Models mediate between theory and world. In an attempt to capture 
the workings of actual explanatory practice, Cartwright provides an account of 
model construction, and of the relationship between law and model, as well as 
model and reality. 
 The function of a model as such is to fit a phenomenon into a theory. 
So, for Cartwright, a model will be constructed along the following lines. 
Firstly, an account is given that attempts to provide all information about the 
phenomenon that is considered relevant. This first account – which Cartwright 
calls an unprepared description – is not constrained by the mathematical 
requirements of the theory. Secondly, the account is prepared. Here the 
phenomenon is informally presented in a way that will bring it into the theory. 
This second account is the prepared description. Thirdly, and finally, the 
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prepared description is formally matched with – or brought under the 
constraints of – the theory’s mathematical requirements. In this final step, a 
model has been constructed. 
 A model, then, is the result of a kind of balancing act between, as 
Cartwright notes, two antagonistic needs. A model must be, on the one hand, 
descriptively adequate to the facts of the phenomenon, and, on the other 
hand, structured by the laws and equations of a theory. Cartwright claims that 
it is generally the case in model construction that the requirements of theory 
will override descriptive adequacy. But at the same time, of course, for the 
model to succeed in fitting a particular phenomenon into a theory, it must bear 
a relation to the phenomenon. 
 But what is the relation between model and phenomenon, and also 
between theoretical law and model? The answer lies in the simulacrum 
account. For Cartwright, a simulacrum is something having merely the form or 
appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its substance or proper 
qualities. And the role that the concept plays in her theory is revealed in the 
following passage: 
 
On the simulacrum account, to explain a phenomenon is to construct a model 
which fits the phenomenon into a theory. The fundamental laws of the theory 
are true of the objects in the model … But the objects of the model have only 
‘the form or appearance of things’ and, in a very strong sense, not their 
‘substance or proper qualities.’2 
 
The relation between model and reality, then, is to be understood in terms of 
the concept of simulacrum. The objects of the model – that is, the entities, 
                                            
2 Ibid., p. 17. 
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features, and processes to which it makes reference – are simulacra of real 
things. They are insubstantial appearances of reality. The relation between 
theoretical law and model, on the other hand, is one of description. Laws are 
true of the objects in the model, they represent them in literal terms.  
Let us summarise the distinction between realism and anti-realism. The 
realist claims that theoretical laws literally represent real objects, while the 
anti-realist claims that laws represent objects of a model that are themselves 
simulacra of reality. Alternatively, we can say that, for the realist, laws directly 
represent the form of a thing along with its substance and proper qualities, 
but, for the anti-realist, laws indirectly represent a thing’s form but without its 
substance or proper qualities. 
The laws of physics, then, are not lies as such. That is Cartwright being 
provocative. Their relation to reality is indirect and non-literal. Thus, the 
thought, put as straightforwardly as possible, is that the realist’s view of the 
relation between law and world is over-simple and hence wrong, while the 
anti-realist’s view captures the subtlety of the representative relationship 
between law and world far better.  
  
[ I I I ] 
 
In the second part of the paper, I want to examine whether Cartwright’s anti-
realism can be applied in the sphere of aesthetics. I will begin by briefly 
sketching the particular view of art at stake, and the prima facie plausible 
reasons for thinking that anti-realism can be profitably employed in the 
philosophy of art.   
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 In the history of aesthetics, there are what may be called three classical 
theories of art each of which emphasise a different feature of aesthetic 
endeavour. They are: art as representation, as form, and as expression. The 
view of art presupposed here is a version of the first. In some of its most 
valuable forms, art is a cognitive affair – by which is meant that art reveals 
something, or provides us with an understanding of, the objects that it deals 
with by means of representation.  
On this view, art has the capacity to provide understanding, but it is a 
form of understanding that is integral to, or realised in, a particular work. What 
is here labelled aesthetic cognition, then, is the activity of engaging with the 
integral understanding of things provided by art. This occurs in both directions: 
creatively by the artist, as well as experientially by the critic. The thing that art 
is particularly well equipped to help us to understand is human life or the 
ethical sphere. This is the view of art used here. 
But what initial reasons are there for thinking that scientific anti-realism 
might shed some light on it? They are twofold. Firstly, anti-realism has an 
aesthetic dimension. The shift from realism to anti-realism is the shift from a 
mimetic conception of the scientist as holding a mirror to nature to the 
constructionist view of the scientist as interpreting nature. There is a lot of the 
artist in the anti-realist’s view of the scientist. This suggests, then, that certain 
things that are true of the anti-realist scientist might also be true of the artist.  
Secondly, Cartwright – in an unexpected reference to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics – draws a parallel between theoretical laws and general 
moral principles, on the one hand, and physical phenomena and everyday 
 9 
moral conduct, on the other hand. This parallel provides the starting point for 
our account. 
 
[ I V ] 
 
The anti-realist view of aesthetic cognitivism provides us with suggestive 
answers to various questions that are central to aesthetics. The first concerns 
the nature of artistic creativity. As the scientist provides an explanation of 
physical phenomena, and so a deeper understanding of them, by constructing 
a model which fits the phenomena into a theory, so the artist provides an 
understanding of everyday ethical phenomena by constructing a model that 
places them into a general ethical perspective. Artistic creativity is to be 
understood, then, as the construction of models of ethical reality.  
The creative process may be described in the following way. The artist 
will already have a certain general ethical perspective, or worldview, or may 
attempt imaginatively to adopt an alternative ethical viewpoint. And at the 
same time the artist will have a number of ideas about concrete ethical 
situations involving characters and actions. Artistic creation, then, is the 
process of fitting these particular situations into an ethical framework in the 
particular medium in which the artist is working. Another word for this is 
aesthetic cognition. And it can be practised by the critic in the interpretation of 
a work. 
 The second question to which we may apply anti-realism is: what is the 
concept of valuable art?  The answer is that a valuable work of art is one that 
functions as a model of ethical reality. Put succinctly, art as ethical model. 
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Valuable art provides an understanding of everyday moral phenomena by 
placing it in the context of a general moral perspective or perspectives. In this 
way art can help us to understand the emotions, desires, and motivations 
according to which people act. 
Thirdly, we can learn from anti-realism something about the 
representative nature of art. The general ethical principles embodied in a work 
of art are not true of everyday ethical reality. That is, general moral laws do 
not literally represent the particular patterns of desires and needs that 
motivate people to behave in particular ways in concrete situations. However, 
they are true of the fictional world of the art work as a model of ethical reality. 
And because the ethical phenomena embodied in a work have been placed in 
the context of a general ethical framework, they are not literally true of 
everyday moral reality. They are simulacra of that reality.  
 Scientific anti-realism, then, provides aesthetic cognivitism with the 
conceptual resources to build a theory of creativity, the nature of art, and the 
representative dimension of art. Clearly, a lot more needs to be done to make 
this more than just an attractive suggestion. In particular, we need to indulge 
in some fairly rigorous art criticism. 
 Since our discussion so far has been highly abstract, I will close by 
briefly attempting to illustrate the foregoing account with a genre example: 
tragic art. I think that it reveals something both aesthetically and ethically 
important to say that tragedy is a model of ethical reality. Tragedy is 
constituted by a pattern of suffering in which intractable and necessary forces 
play themselves out in the sphere of human action and interaction. These 
forces seem blindly to function according to the dictates of profound ethical 
 11 
laws. But everyday moral reality is just not like that. Which is to say that the 
ethical laws of tragedy – though true of the worldview embodied in tragic art – 
are not literally true of human life. Nor are the tragic protagonists literally true. 
They resemble us, but do not mirror us. They are, in other words, our 
simulacra; they possess our appearance, but not our substantial qualities. But 
all this does not prevent tragedy from giving us a deeper understanding of 
human life. 
 
